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I. INTRODUCTION 
Our rules for income taxation of the family are so complex, arbitrary, and 
inconsistent that it is impossible to imagine anyone could ever have planned 
them. Because intelligent design must be ruled out, that leaves only evolution as 
an explanation. This article examines only a small part of that evolution - the 
rule of joint and several liability of spouses who file joint returns. This rule, as 
we will see, was unfair and unjustified when it was first enacted in 1938. When 
its inevitable problems became insupportable in the 1970s, instead of repealing 
the rule, exceptions known as the "innocent spouse" rules were enacted which 
were inadequate and poorly conceived. The painful shortcomings of the 1971 
innocent spouse rules did not lead to repeal of joint return liability, as they should 
have, but instead provoked yet more rounds of reform legislation to expand inno-
cent spouse relief in the vain hope that the old medicine might still work if only 
enough were taken. The most recent of these reforms occurred in the Restructur-
ing and Reform Act of 1998,1 as a result of which the relief rules, already com-
plex and confusing, mushroomed into an enormous body of new law. The 
purpose of this article is to provide a report card for these reforms, to explain why 
they are a failure, and to show that no further expansion of relief can ever solve 
the problem. The only solution is to start over by repealing joint return liability. 
Ironically, the hearings which led to the 1998 Reform Act were prompted by a 
very worthwhile attempt to do exactly that, but behind closed doors, repeal was 
quietly killed and replaced with yet more of the same ill-conceived relief rules. 
The underlying problem is this: Since 1938, the Internal Revenue Code 
("l.R.C.") has required spouses filing joint returns to be jointly and severally 
liable for each other's income taxes. This joint return liability ("JRL") extends 
not only to the amount which is self-assessed and appears on the return itself, but 
also to any and all additional taxes which may be due to omitted items and to 
disallowance of deductions or credits.2 No warning of this limitless liability ap-
pears anywhere on the tax return itself, and very few people who are not tax 
professionals are aware of the liability, or have any reason to be, until it is too 
late. Separate filing as married persons entails no such liability at all, but by the 
time this advantage is appreciated, it is no longer of any use because amending a 
return from joint to separate is not permitted. 3 
The problem is enormous and potentially affects all married taxpayers. 
About ninety-eight percent of married couples file jointly because that status usu-
1. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, §§ 3201(a), 
(e)(l), 12 Stat. 734, 739 (codified at I.R.C. § 6015 (2000)). 
2. I.R.C. § 6013(d)(3) (2000). 
3. The two percent of married couples who file separately are permitted to amend their returns later and 
switch to joint status, but the ninety-eight percent who file jointly may not amend and re-file separately. 
Qyite obviously, the sole purpose of the one-way statutory rule is to prevent the taxpayer from extracting 
herself from the JRL booby trap. Until 1922, the Bureau of Internal Revenue by administrative rule 
allowed taxpayers to amend and re-file in either direction, but then changed its rule to forbid re-filing in 
either direction. See Grant v. Rose, 24 F.2d 115 (D.Ga. 1928). 
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ally provides a small but irresistible4 tax advantage over filing separately as 
married persons. 5 Of these, I estimate that at least 50,0006 women are probably 
forced to pay taxes on their husband's or ex-husband's income each year, and 
perhaps some 15,000 of these victims are separated or divorced at the time they 
are forced to pay. Although the statute is gender-neutral, in practice the vast 
majority of victims of JRL, probably more than ninety-five percent, are women, 
and so for convenience, unless otherwise indicated, I will call these victims 
'' . " « " wives or women. 
There exists, of course, statutory relief in the form of the so-called "innocent 
spouse" rules,7 but they are still far too restrictive and generate an inordinate 
amount of friction and litigation. Taxpayers make about 50,000 innocent spouse 
claims to the I.RS. each year. 8 Between forty and fifty innocent spouse ("IS") 
decisions are reported in the courts every year, which is nearly one each week, 
making the IS relief under section 6015 arguably the most frequently litigated 
issue in the Code. 9 
The most difficult barrier to relief has always been, and remains, that under 
the "innocence" rule the wife loses if she has any knowledge of (or reason to know 
of) the husband's tax items which trigger the understatement of tax.10 It will be 
argued in this article that such knowledge and ignorance is a hopelessly irrational 
basis for offering relief, and that this is the main reason the new relief rules, like 
the old ones, are a failure. 
4. Irresistible, that is, only as long as one is unaware of the JRL trap. 
5. On the other hand, about forty percent of married persons would pay less taxes if they were not married at 
all, or were allowed to file using the rates applicable to single persons. 
6. This estimate is based upon the General Accounting Office's figures for 1999-2001 showing about 50,000 
innocent spouse claims made per year, of which about seventy percent are denied relief. U.S. GEN. Ac-
COUNTING OFFICE, INNOCENT SPOUSE PROGRAM 15 (2002) [hereinafter GAO, INNOCENT SPOUSE 
PROGRAM]. To these must be added those women, perhaps much more numerous, who make no resistance 
but simply pay and suffer in silence. 
7. I.RC. § 6015 (2000). 
8. GAO, INNOCENT SPOUSE PROGRAM, supra note 6, at 15. 
9. NAT. TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 532 (2005) [hereinafter NTA REP. 2005]. 
The NTA counts innocent spouse relief as the eighth most frequently litigated issue. However, five of the 
more frequently litigated issues on its list are penalties which apply to a vast number of substantive issues, 
and similarly, business deductions under section 162 (and other sections) cover an enormous number of 
unrelated issues, as does the number one issue of collection due process appeals. Family status issues (sev-
enth on the NTA list, including dependent exemptions, EITC, child care credit, and more) are also far 
more diverse than IS relief, which makes I.RC. section 6015 relief the most litigated substantive liability 
rules in the Code. The NT A's 2006 Report again listed JRL as the eighth most litigated issue, and 
counted fifty-one reported decisions for the year. NAT. TAXPAYER AovocATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CON-
GRESS 553 (2006) [hereinafter NTA REP. 2006]. 
10. As a result of the 1998 reforms, the wife may obtain relief for underpayments as well, but again only if 
she can show she had no reason to know that the husband would not pay. 
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On the other hand, no relief rules short of outright repeal of JRL can ever 
provide sufficient relief because JRL itself is unfair.11 The United States is vir-
tually the only country in the developed world which insists upon JRL, 12 even 
among countries which permit income-splitting to married persons filing 
jointly.13 Almost without exception other industrialized countries do not impose 
any tax liability on women for their husbands' income.14 By contrast, under U.S. 
law, women are routinely subjected to assessment or collection, even after separa-
tion or divorce, for no reason other than that they elected to file jointly.15 
A great opportunity to repeal JRL was squandered in 1998, and the new 
I.RC. section 6015 which was enacted instead is, for all its great complication, 
not much more than business as usual. The reason, at bottom, appears to be the 
I.R.S.'s unwillingness to give up its power to seize whatever assets lie in easy 
reach, even if they belong to the wrong taxpayer. 
Section II of this article will explore the surprisingly shaky foundation of the 
rule of JRL itself. Section III then explores the profound irrationality of condi-
tioning relief upon "innocence" and the historical misunderstandings which led to 
the choice of that form of relie£ Next, the uncertainties of the old IS rules are 
explained and the reasons for general dissatisfaction with them are described. 
Section IV traces the background reasons for the 1998 reforms, explains the new 
rules and their shortcomings, and comes to the unhappy conclusion that they are 
11. The excellent account in the National Taxpayer Advocate's 2005 Annual Report to Congress. NTA REP. 
2005, supra note 9, at 530-35. 
l 2. Joint liability is rooted in long outdated assumptions of the economic unity and permanence of marriage. 
Rules holding spouses liable for each other's taxes are an anachronism, and have been repealed, or severely 
limited, in all other developed countries where they once existed. For example, no marital liability for 
income taxes is imposed in any form in Canada, Australia, Japan, Italy, Spain, Sweden, or the United 
Kingdom. See JosEPH PECHMAN, COMPARATIVE TAX SYSTEMS: EUROPE, CANADA AND JAPAN TAX 
ANALYSTS (1987). 
13. Compare Germany, which provides for favorable rates on joint returns through income-splitting com-
puted as under U.S. law, with France and Belgium, which both provide systems of income-splitting which 
are more generous than under U.S. law because income is further split with children as well as spouses. 
14. In France, joint liability is imposed in principle (Code General des lmpots [CGI] art. 1685), but the tax 
administration must attempt collection from the husband before turning to the wife. See Instruction 
Administrative of Feb. 18, 1985, 5-B-10-85, No. 14. 
In the U.K., husbands were formerly liable for tax on their wives' income, but wives were never liable for 
their husbands' taxes. This system was abolished in 1990 in favor of completely separate liability for both 
spouses. Finance Act of 1988, ss 32, 148, Sched. 14 Part VII. 
In Germany, joint and several liability is imposed in principle (under Abgabeordnung 44), but either 
spouse has the right to request individual assessment at any time before the tax is paid (under Einkom-
mensteuergesetz 26(b)). 
For details, as well as the treatment of spousal tax liability at the state level, see Richard C.E. Beck, The 
Innocent Spouse Problem: Joint and Several Liability far Income Taxes Should be Repealed, 43 
VAND. L. REV. 317 (1990). 
15. The l.R.S. keeps no statistics on the number of instances of collection from the wrong spouse, nor of the 
amounts involved. It appears that such collections may be on the order of some 50,000 instances annually. 
See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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fatally flawed in their conception and execution. Because this is a story of the 
evolution of law, we begin at the beginning. 
II. ORIGINS OF JOINT RETURN LIABILITY 
The rule of joint return liability was first enacted in 1938. Until then, 
filing jointly (which had been allowed since 1918) did not entail joint and sepa-
rate liability of the spouses, despite the government's insistence to the contrary. 
The issue was litigated several times, and was not finally resolved until the 
Ninth Circuit's 1935 decision against the government in Cole v. Commis-
sioner.16 In Cole, the Ninth Circuit held that a taxpayer's "cardinal right to be 
taxed only on his own income"17 was unchanged by joint filing, and rejected the 
government's argument that "administrative necessity'' requires joint and several 
liability because the respective separate incomes of the spouses are not ascertaina-
ble.18 The government argued that because joint returns do not explicitly set 
forth the respective separate incomes and deductions of the spouses, it was unable 
to determine the separate amounts for which each spouse should be liable. 
Surprisingly, there was no apportionment difficulty even in the Cole litiga-
tion. The proper allocation of tax items was stipulated. The Bureau of Internal 
Revenue had simply assessed the husband by mistake and then negligently al-
lowed the statute of limitations run as to the wife. The Ninth Circuit correctly 
pointed out that in case of doubt, the I.R.S. could always assess both spouses, and 
let the taxpayers themselves prove the sources of their income.19 In fact, alloca-
tion of tax items has almost never been any problem, then or now. In all the vast 
body of innocent spouse litigation over the last thirty-five years (perhaps 700 
reported decisions), there are few, if any, in which the principal issue was proper 
allocation of a tax item.20 It is a non-problem. 
A far more focused solution for rescuing the I.R.S. from its own blunders in 
situations such as Cole (if any were needed at all) would have been possible in 
other ways. For example, if one accepts the I.R.S.'s argument at face value, an 
easy solution lay within its own power, namely to print two-column forms show-
ing the separate items of the spouses, as several states do.21 The I.R.S.'s claim 
that its own forms do not provide adequate information is a weak argument at 
best, and tantamount to claiming that its forms should determine the law rather 
than the other way around. It is telling that this same suspect argument of "ad-
16. Cole v. Comm'r, 81 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1935), rev'g 29 B.T.A. 602 (1933). 
17. Cole, 81 F.2d at 487. 
1 8. Id. at 488. 
19. Id. 
20. MICHAEL SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE~ 7B.10[3][c] (2002), cites no decisions. 
21. The NTA recommends introducing split-column returns and repealing JRL. NTA REP. 2005, supra note 
9, at 408-09. 
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ministrative necessity" was the only justification put forth by the government 
when Congress legislatively overruled Cole three years later by enacting the 
predecessor of I.RC. section 6013(d)(3) in 1938. The argument was not persua-
sive then, and it is even less so today, but this was how the I.RS. obtained its 
enormous and all-too-easily abused power of coercing payment from either spouse 
(or ex-spouse) at its pleasure. 
At the very same time of the Cole litigation, the Treasury was insisting 
upon new regulations (later invalidated) which would limit each spouse's chari-
table contributions separately on joint returns, a calculation which, ironically, 
required the government to make the very same determination of the separate net 
incomes of the spouses which in Cole it claimed it could not do. Today there is no 
difficulty in determining each spouse's income on a joint return, and such alloca-
tions are routinely made under I.RC. section 6015 as well as in other circum-
stances. The audit process almost necessarily reveals the source of any asserted 
deficiency.22 Unwinding a joint return is often required for a variety of reasons, 
such as in order to limit the amount of each spouse's separate losses which may be 
carried forward or back to offset that spouse's share of income in a joint return 
year, and in order to calculate the amount of each spouse's separate right to a 
refund from a joint return.23 The method used is to calculate each spouse's net 
income as if she had filed separately. There are adequate rules under current law 
for apportioning personal deductions and dependent exemptions for this 
purpose.24 
Persuasive reasons for imposing joint return liability have never been pro-
vided. A frequently advanced canard is that JRL may be justified by the eco-
nomic unity of the family. There is no evidence, however, that couples ordinarily 
share all or most of their property, much less that they ignore separate ownership 
to such an extent that they can be presumed indifferent to the incidence of tax 
liability.25 The limited studies available all point to the exact opposite conclu-
sion.26 Couples who have incomes and savings which exceed their minimum 
needs tend to make individual spending decisions regarding their own money, 
22. Most deficiencies are assessed as a result of matching the return with information forms W-2, 1099, K-1, 
and the like, which reveal the source of income. 
23. See Rev. Ru!. 80-7, 1980-1 C.B. 296 and Rev. Ru!. 80-8, 1980-1 C.B. 298 for "separate tax method of 
allocation" applied to refunds. For losses, see Rev. Ru!. 60-216, 1960-1 C.B. 126, Rev. Ru!. 65-140, 
1965-1 C.B. 127, and Rev. Ru!. 75-368, 1975-2 C.B. 480. The Treasury has apparently never exper-
ienced any difficulty administering these rules. 
24. Over one million separate returns are filed each year by married persons, with no apparent difficulty. On 
the other hand, it is not clear how many of these involve couples who are still living together and whose 
personal finances are commingled. 
25. See NTA REP. 2005, supra note 9, at 421 & nn.81-87. 
26. See Shari Motro, A New 'I Do': Towards a Marriage-Neutral Income Tax, 91 IowA L. REV. 1509, 
1523-26 (2006), and sources cited therein; see also Beck, supra note 14, at 380-81; Marjorie E. Korn-
hauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 
HASTINGS LJ. 63 (1993); NTA REP. 2005, supra note 9, at 421 (citing Frances Woolley, Control Over 
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however much they may regard economic pooling as an ideal. Married women 
often say they work chiefly in order to have their own discretionary income. 
Moreover, even if pooling of resources could be regarded as the norm,27 it still 
would not justify joint liability. Pooling is after all a voluntary and private 
arrangement which the spouses are free to change at any time and in any way 
they please. Why such voluntary sharing should give the I.RS. the right to com-
pulsory collection from a non-earning wife has never been explained.28 
The difficulty becomes even greater after termination of the supposed eco-
nomic unity of the family by divorce.29 Joint filing is completely unrelated to 
pooling. Some couples still file jointly even after they are separated legally and 
economically, just to obtain a tax advantage. Other couples who happily share 
hearth, home, and income will file separately if their software indicates a lower 
tax. Filing separately does not suggest even the slightest whiff of marital discord. 
Another rationalization for JRL is the much-repeated error that it was en-
acted as the "price one must pay" for lower tax rates on joint returns.30 The 
favorable tax rates for joint returns computed by income-splitting were not in-
Money in Marriage, in MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY 105 (Shoshana A. Grossbard-Schechtman ed., 
2003). 
2 7. It should be noted here that the concept of "pooling" or "economic unity" is quite vague, and any attempt to 
sharpen a definition for the purpose of basing law upon it is sure to raise controversy and confusion. For 
example, should a prenuptial agreement in some or any of its endless possible forms negate pooling? Are 
the children of a prior marriage part of the family's "economic unity"? Do equal-earning spouses who 
always go out "Dutch" pool more or less than a single-earner couple which goes out less often? 
28. See Bryan Camp, The Unhappy Marriage of Law and Equity in joint Return Liability, 108 TAX 
NOTES 1307, 1309 (2005). According to Professor Camp, JRL can be justified by the economic unity of 
the family. He points out that family members are often treated differently by the tax law than unrelated 
individuals, citing as an example I.RC. section 267 which disallows loss deductions between family mem-
bers. This is quite true as far as it goes, and every tax system I know of takes account of family relation-
ships in one way or another both for purposes of rates and of anti-abuse provisions. But this is a far cry 
from justifying joint liability. The example of I.R.C. section 267 itself proves too much: Brothers are not 
liable for their sisters' taxes, nor mothers for their sons, despite the disallowance of losses between them. 
Professor Camp does write that development of a full justification is beyond the scope his article (though he 
is confident the full argument can be made), and so we should perhaps leave the matter at that. It is 
noteworthy though that to my knowledge the full argument has never even been attempted by anyone 
since the issue surfaced more than seventy years ago. As we will see, when Congress asked the Treasury in 
1997 to defend JRL, the Treasury gave no justification at all and discussed some procedural issues instead. 
See infra note 63. 
29. If a separated or divorced couple has already made a final division of their property, imposition of joint 
liability will have the effect of upsetting that agreement by forcing the equivalent of a transfer of property 
from wife to husband. The I.RS. is not bound by any agreement between the spouses as to liability for 
contingent tax obligations. 
Application of JRL against separated and divorced women seems to be an unintended consequence of the 
original enactment of joint return liability. Not one of the half-dozen cases litigated before its enactment 
in 1938 involved separation or divorce. The I.R.S. seems to have developed its aggressive position in this 
area in the 1960s, during the post-war explosion of divorce rates. This social development could not have 
been foreseen in 1938. 
30. See Camp, supra note 28, at 1307-08. 
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traduced until 1948, some ten years after enactment of joint return liability.31 
Moreover, the right of spouses filing jointly to offset deductions and losses against 
each other's income and gains had been available to taxpayers from 1918 until 
1938 without the "price" of joint and several liability. Joint returns were intro-
duced in 1918, apparently for the sole purpose of convenience both for taxpayers 
and for the government, without any thought of a special rate advantage for 
married persons.32 For many two-earner married couples, filing jointly is disad-
vantageous compared to filing as single persons. 33 
Even for those couples who do enjoy valuable tax benefits by filing joint 
returns under the current rules, the size of the benefits bears no relation to the 
joint return liability assumed, which may be unlimited in amount. The quid-
pro-quo explanation cannot justify joint liability for amounts which may be far 
in excess of the tax saving from filing jointly. Also, the "benefits" usually inure to 
the husband, while the liability is almost always borne by the wife.34 
Ill. THE INNOCENT SPOUSE RULES 
A. Dubious Origins 
Congress enacted the first "innocent spouse" rules under former I.R.C. sec-
tion 6013(e) in 1971 in order to mitigate the harsh effects of joint return liability, 
particularly in the wake of the Supreme Court's 1961 decision in fames v. 
United States which held embezzlements to be taxable. 35 Because the first IS 
rules track almost exactly the terms of judicial relief from JSL granted by the 
Sixth Circuit in some of these embezzlement cases, right down to the fateful 
"innocence" criterion, it is worthwhile to look at the judicial origins of the IS 
rules. 
From its enactment in 1938 until 1971, the only escape from JRL was to 
show that the filing was not joint, for example, because the wife's signature ob-
tained by duress.36 Inventive lawyers pushed this duress defense to include in-
31 . Income-splitting was not enacted as compensation for assuming joint return liability, but for the entirely 
different purpose of equalizing the tax burden between the common law states and the community prop-
erty states, where income-splitting was already allowed on separate returns. This doctrine was estab-
lished in Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930). 
32. A larger standard deduction was available to married persons, however, whether or not they filed jointly. 
3 3. That is the "marriage penalty." The tax advantage of joint filing is modest in most cases. This "advan-
tage" would disappear for many couples if married persons were allowed to file separately as unmarried 
persons. 
34. Fewer women than men are self-employed, and self-employed persons have much greater opportunity to 
conceal income and to take aggressive tax positions. Also, criminal enterprise and risky behavior in gen-
eral which results in unreported income is probably more common among men than women. Thus, joint 
return deficiencies are more likely to be caused by the husband, and are also likely to be greater in amount 
than deficiencies caused by the wife. Equal application of the law thus has distinctly unequal consequences. 
35. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961). 
36. See, e.g., Furnish v. Comm'r, 262 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1958). 
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validation of signatures procured by fraud and trickery, and this too was 
successful at least in the very sympathetic cases brought to the Sixth Circuit in-
volving wives who were assessed taxes (plus the fifty percent fraud penalty and 
interest) on their husbands' embezzlements, even though they knew nothing of 
the embezzlements and had not profited from them. The taxpayers' theory was 
that if the wife had known of the embezzlements, she would never have signed 
the joint return. 
The Tax Court uniformly rejected this argument on the ground that there 
was no showing that the wife's signature was the direct result of the husband's 
concealment.37 This implies, correctly I think, that the wife might well have 
signed anyway even if she had known of the embezzlements. This did in fact 
often occur in later cases and still does today because the wife has almost certainly 
has no inkling of the concealed JRL she assumes by signing. 38 
In Scudder v. Commissioner, the first and most egregious of the Sixth 
Circuit cases, the business which the husband managed and from which he had 
embezzled was actually owned by the wife and her sisters.39 She was neverthe-
less held liable by the Tax Court for the tax and the fifty percent fraud penalty as 
well. The result was of course outrageous. The Tax Court was well aware of 
that, and expressed its sympathy and regret, but it felt its hands were tied. The 
Sixth Circuit reversed, stating: 
We just cannot persuade ourselves that the executions of the joint re-
turns here were not the product of conduct equivalent in wrong to the 
fraud, trickery and indeed, the duress which the Tax Court appears to 
3 7. Another weakness in the argument is that it was well settled that fraud of a primary obligor in obtaining 
the promise of a guarantor does not affect the rights of the promisee, and unless the promisee knew of or 
participated in the fraud, the promisee can still enforce the guarantee. See, e.g., Cresap v. Furst & 
Thomas, 105 So. 848 (Miss. 1925). The JRL of a wife is similar to the obligation of a guarantor. 
38. The IS case law is replete with sad examples of women who signed joint returns in circumstances where it 
was obvious to anyone that the husband could not or would not pay. See, e.g., Newberry v. Johnson, 743 
S.W.2d 811 (Ark. 1988) (husband's lawyer's failure to warn wife of JSL as she signed delinquent joint 
returns at divorce spelled out cause of action for malpractice when she was later forced to pay); see also 
Etkin v. Comm'r, 90 T.C.M. (CCH) 417 (2005) (wife had reason to know that husband would not pay 
2000 tax liability because she knew he had not paid 1997-1999 liabilities); Levy v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1101 (2005) (wife knew of collection actions taken against gambler husband); Johnson v. Comm'r, 
65 T.C.M. (CCH) 2760 (1993) (wife signed joint return the day before husband entered guilty plea to 
forty-one counts of embezzlement); Negoescu v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2005-161, 2005 WL 3068362 
(U.S. Tax Ct. Nov. 8, 2005) (no equitable relief available to divorced wife for husband's items on 1991 
and 1992 returns; she had reason to know he would not pay because he had not paid tax on time and in 
full for any of their joint returns since 1984); Griffin v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2005-41, 2005 WL 
845904 (U.S. Tax Ct. Apr. 13, 2005) (wife liable and had reason to know husband could not pay delin-
quent taxes because they were in bankruptcy when she signed joint returns - prepared by an enrolled 
agent - for seven prior years of non-filing). 
39. Scudder v. Comm'r, 405 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1968), revg 48 T.C. 36 (1967), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 886 
(1969). 
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concede will insulate its victim from liabilities which would otherwise 
accrue.40 
This did not quite answer the Tax Court's point that there had been no 
showing that the wife's signature was the direct result of the husband's decep-
tion.41 In any event, it noted the Tax Court's observation that the husband 
would have been unlikely to view his unauthorized loans as taxable because em-
bezzlements only became taxable through retroactive application of the Supreme 
Court's later decision in James v. United States.42 If the husband himself did 
not believe his withdrawals belonged on the joint return in the first place, his 
motive in leaving them off could not have been to trick his wife into signing an 
inaccurate return. 
On the other hand, if the wife does know of her husband's inaccuracies on 
the return, she will be unlikely to fall into the trap of JRL unless she is duped by 
the government. She would not deliberately incur her husband's understated tax 
liabilities if she knew of JRL; she would simply file separately instead. This is 
why the government is not eager for her to know about JRL, and almost cer-
tainly why there is not and never has been any warning on the signature line, or 
anywhere else on the joint return.43 
It is difficult to imagine a more unfortunate choice of terms than "innocent 
spouse" to describe the relief which was enacted in 1971.44 The term was appar-
ently imported from matrimonial law at a time when the no-fault revolution in 
divorce was already rendering the term obsolete.45 Unlike the divorce situation 
in which the guilty spouse has caused harm to the innocent spouse, the tax situa-
tion involves no harm to anyone. Innocence implies lack of guilt, but the wife 
who happens to know of her husband's tax cheating is not guilty of anything. She 
is not cheating or misreporting herself,46 and she is under no pre-existing duty to 
40. Scudder, 405 F.2d at 226. 
41. To make things more confusing, the Sixth Circuit held (on an issue not before it) that the embezzlements 
were actually loans and not taxable in the first place, on the ground that the wife and her sisters accepted 
them after the fact as loans and entered them as such on the partnership's books, and also because the 
matter was never prosecuted. Id. at 227. This despite the fact that in the Tax Court the parties had 
stipulated that the withdrawals were embezzlements. 
42. James, 366 U.S. 213. 
43. It appears that very few taxpayers are, or have any reason to be, aware of this assumption of liability. 
There no warning on the Form 1040 and tax preparers rarely inform wives of their potential liability. 
Preparers of joint returns nearly always ignore their almost inherent conflict of interest. 
44. The term is not in the statute itself; however, it does appear in the 2002 Treasury Regulations at section 
1.6015-l(a)(i) and on the new Form 8857 for claiming "innocent spouse" relief. It has always been the 
popular name for the relief provisions. SALTZMAN, supra note 20, uses the term throughout his work. 
45. Under the older "fault" system, only the spouse who had not violated the marriage contract (using criteria 
which varied greatly from state to state) was entitled to a divorce, and then divorce was granted only if 
the other spouse was guilty of such a violation, typically including at least adultery or abandonment. 
46. It may be that the Scudder court was particularly exercised by the government's imposition of the fifty 
percent fraud penalty where the wife was concededly innocent (in the plain English sense) of any fraud. 
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report her husband's cheating to the government, much less to stop him, or to pay 
the tax herself. Her knowledge does not harm the government any more than her 
ignorance protects it. Her only "fault" is to have signed a joint return instead of 
filing separately. The innocent spouse rules have accidentally created a sort of 
quasi-duty of due diligence; if the wife fails to read the return and to ask about 
potentially dubious items, she may be ineligible for relief and hence liable for the 
tax herself.47 This due diligence is pointless, however, because exercising it does 
not benefit the government, and failure to do so does not injure the government 
or anyone else.48 
It is true that a wife who neither knew of nor profited from the husband's 
tax delinquency seems more sympathetic, all else equal, than a wife who both 
knew of and enjoyed some of the proceeds of his misreporting. But that does not 
mean that there are any plausible grounds to tax the "aware" spouse just because 
of her awareness, or a benefited spouse, just because she profited. A wife filing 
separately would have no liability for her awareness any more than a girlfriend 
would, even if she enjoyed some or all of the proceeds. 
Despite all this, the term itself "innocent spouse" through its associations 
seems to have exercised an unfortunate degree of influence in making the relief 
rules seem fair although they plainly are not. I think there are several reasons for 
this. First, it makes it easier for administrators and judges to impose liability if 
the wife is not "innocent" - the liability is then her own fault and the punish-
ment can be imposed on her with a clear conscience. In short, it makes it easy to 
blame the victim. Conversely, if the husband has abused the wife physically, 
emotionally or by deceit in financial affairs, the IS rules allow the exonerating 
administrator or judge to assume the chivalrous pose of protecting her, when in 
fact she is only paying her own correct amount of tax. Finally, the IS rules have 
had the soothing effect of diverting attention away from the arbitrary and unfair 
rule of JRL and toward the more satisfying task of measuring and judging the 
moral conduct of the spouses instead.49 It is unfortunately only a slight exaggera-
In one of the earliest mentions of an "innocent spouse," the reference seems to be to the fraud penalty. 
Spanos v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 861, 864 (D. Md. 1963). 
4 7. Note also that even if the wife is aware of her "duty" to certify the accuracy of the return, the penalty for 
breaching it is unfair. If a professional return preparer or an I.RS. agent fails to use due diligence, he 
does not become liable for the tax deficiency he could reasonably have been expected to discover on someone 
else's return. And yet such persons have both tax expertise and awareness of their professional duties, 
upon which the I.RS. does reasonably rely. 
48. One might add that the original purpose of the joint return (convenience) is at least partly defeated if the 
wife must review it at her peril. Return preparation is an unpleasant business at best, and it is efficient 
to allocate this chore to one spouse. 
49. Professor Camp has written a far more positive account of the IS rules: "[T]he substance of spousal relief 
provisions since 1971 has remained the same: Spousal relief is available only to the extent that the as-
sumption of economic unity underlying the joint liability rule can be shown to be false." Camp, supra note 
28, at 1314. As noted above, I do not think that JRL can be justified by a theory of economic unity as a 
starting point. Nor do I think the IS rules flow easily from this assumption. For example, in the statute 
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tion to describe the wife who is assessed with her husband's taxes as doomed to 
exploitation and abuse. If her husband did not abuse her, the I.R.S. will. 
The Sixth Circuit did not have the power to write JRL out of the Code. It 
could only stretch the law in certain situations to try to show that the return was 
not joint. The innocence defense {actually, "defrauded" defense would be more 
accurate) had no other purpose, and should not have been taken seriously as any-
thing other than what it was: a makeshift ad hoc argument whose success owed 
less to its plausibility than to the fact that allowing the government to win would 
have been an outrage. The drafters of fresh legislative relief from JRL were not 
under the limitations of the Scudder court, and yet their 1971 IS relief rules 
were little more than a slavish copying of the "innocence" rule in Scudder. 50 
Lack of benefit would have been a far more promising basis for legislative 
relief than the "awareness" factor, especially if liability were limited to the 
amount of money or property the wife received and had control over. This would 
have avoided some severe problems that have always plagued the IS rules. 
Knowledge seems to require liability even where there is no benefit at all. And 
even without knowledge, any "significant" benefit may trigger a liability which 
is hugely disproportionate. If benefit were the sole test, and if the I.R.S. were 
forbidden to attempt collection from the wife until exhausting all possibilities of 
collection from the husband, it would have become clear that no relief rules were 
needed at all. Repeal of JRL and the use of transferee liability51 instead would 
have accomplished much the same result. But the drafters of the IS rules appar-
ently never considered this alternative, and since then every problem of unfair 
enforcement of JRL has been misperceived as a mere glitch that could be corrected 
by amending the IS rules yet again. 
as well as the regulations and the case law, the primacy which has always been put upon the factor of 
innocence points away from this interpretation. There are many decisions holding in favor of the una-
ware wife even where the husband has shared some or all of the money which should have been paid in 
taxes, as long as the sharing was not so lavish or unusual to put the wife on notice. Refusal to share 
money is almost nonexistent as a factor in the case law compared to refusal to share information about 
money. Thus a much better case could be made for marital trust as a consistently important factor than for 
economic sharing - to the extent that any such generalizations can be made. 
50. The Scudder decision was mentioned in the S. REP. No. 91-1537, at 2 (1970). The fact that the wife did 
not benefit in Scudder was strictly speaking irrelevant to the validity of her signature, but it did clearly 
influence the Sixth Circuit's decision, and found its way into the new relief rules as well. 
51. Transferee liability under I.R.C. section 6901 would apply only to the extent of property transferred to the 
wife, and cannot apply absent such a transfer, unlike I.RC. section 6013(d). Also, the I.RS. would 
generally be required prove that the husband was insolvent at the time of a transfer, or that he became 
insolvent as a result, and that the property was transferred without adequate or fair consideration. In 
determining insolvency, debts include unpaid income tax liabilities, whether assessed or not. 
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B. Haphazard Relief under Former LR.C. Section 6013(e) 
Under former I.RC. section 6013(e), as it stood before the 1998 reforms,s2 a 
wife could be relieved of liability for tax items of the husband only if they were 
"grossly erroneous";s3 they caused a "substantial understatement";s4 the wife did 
not know, and had no reason to know of the substantial understatement caused 
by such items ("innocence"); and taking into account all the facts and circum-
stances, it would be inequitable to hold the wife liable for the understatement 
("equity"). The wife had the burden of proof as to each of the elements for relief. 
The relief rules were unsatisfactory because they were vague and unpredictable 
due to the nature of the "innocence" and "equity" requirements.ss There is a large 
body of case law interpreting the innocence requirement. Factors which have 
been used by the courts as indicating that the wife had "reason to know" include 
lavish or unusual expenditures, involvement in the family budget or the hus-
band's business, higher education or business experience, and whether the hus-
band was secretive in his business affairs. The courts have not applied these 
factors consistently, and so the decisions are in conflict, and the outcomes are 
largely unpredictable.56 The same may be said of the equity requirement, which 
5 2. There were many rounds of reform of the innocent spouse rules between 1971 and 1998. The most 
important of these was the 1984 amendments which for the first time expanded relief from its original 
limitation to omissions of income to include as well erroneous deductions and credits. 
5 3. An item of omitted income was "grossly erroneous" per se. Erroneous claims of deduction, credit, or basis 
may also qualify for relief, but such items were required in addition to be "without foundation in fact or 
law." This phrase was given conflicting interpretations by the courts, and severely limited relief for such 
items. Mere disallowance of a deduction was not enough. Note that it is sometimes difficult to determine 
whether an item is income or deduction, such as reallocation of capital gain to ordinary income, over 
which there is a split of authority. 
Items other than omitted income, and erroneous claims of deduction, credit, or basis were ineligible for 
relief, such as the alternative minimum tax, and the self-employment tax. There was no relief for simple 
nonpayment of tax where the return was correct; relief was in effect limited to items of negligence and 
fraud. There was no obvious reason for these limitations, and they had the somewhat bizarre effect of 
putting the wife in a better position if the husband misreported than if he reported honestly. Unfortu-
nately, this is still the case to some extent under new l.R.C. section 6015. 
54. There were dollar limitations under former l.R.C. sections 6013(e)(3) and (4) restricting relief to items 
exceeding $500, and in the case of erroneous claims of deduction, credit, or basis, the item was in addition 
required to exceed a percentage-of-income floor. 
5 5. The rules also limited relief in many deserving cases due to the arbitrary restrictions to "grossly erroneous" 
items and to "substantial understatements," but these requirements were eliminated in the 1998 reforms. 
56. For example, the cases are split as to whether the wife has a duty to review the return. Compare, for 
example, the pre-1998 tax shelter decisions in Cohen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 944 (1987), 
and Shapiro v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 818 (1986), where taxpayers lost, with the decisions 
in Hinds v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 104 (1988) and Estate of Killian v. Commissioner, 53 
T.C.M. (CCH) 1438 (1987), where taxpayers won. 
Another inconsistency concerns the doctrine that if the wife is aware of the existence of the underlying 
transaction, ignorance of the tax consequences is no excuse, which originated in McCoy v. Commis-
sioner, 57 T.C. 732 (1972) (holding the wife liable for section 357(c) gain from husband's incorporation of 
deficit partnership where both were ignorant of tax consequences), and was inaptly interpreted as analo-
gous to the criminal law doctrine that "innocence of the law is no excuse" (in dictum) in Sanders v. United 
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focused on whether the wife received a significant benefit from the husband's 
understatement.57 Unfortunately, the same inconsistencies still plague cases 
under the current I.RC. section 6015. Because of the difficulties in applying the 
innocence test in particular, the IS rules tended to degenerate into a global subjec-
tive test of whether the spouse seeking relief can move the judge to sympathy. If 
she can, difficulties disappear because the factors are flexible enough to accommo-
date almost any conclusion. So, for example, if circumstances seem to require it, 
money which the wife received from the husband can be interpreted as benefiting 
her children and not herself, or the other way around, the funding of her chil-
dren's education with untaxed dollars may be held a significant benefit to her 
instead. 58 Similarly, clues to possible misbehavior of the husband may be inter-
preted as perfectly innocent when viewed from her circumstances, or held to be 
reasons for her to have looked further and found out the offending item(s), as 
needed. If the wife fails to elicit sympathy, the judge might add insult to injury 
with such comments as Congress did not intend to offer relief for "willful igno-
rance" or "turning a blind eye" or for an "ostrich imitation."59 If she succeeds, on 
the other hand, she might be commended on what the judge views as her good 
States, 509 F.2d 162, 169 n.14 (5th Cir. 1975). The Tax Court affirmed this doctrine in Bokum v. 
Commissioner, 94 T.C. 126 (1990). Both McCoy and Bokum involved wives still living with their 
husbands at the time of trial. Indeed denying relief to wives still living with their husbands seems to have 
been the real reason for the otherwise inexplicably absurd McCoy doctrine. 
The McCoy doctrine has been glossed over without mention in many cases allowing divorced or widowed 
women relie£ See, e.g., Guth v. Comm'r, 897 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1990) (wife participated in creation of 
phony charitable contributions); Ratana v. Comm'r, 662 F.2d 220 (4th Cir.1981) (deserted wife knew of 
husband's employment); Hayes v. Comm'r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 869 (1989) (deserted wife knew of hus-
band's employment); and Estate of Vella, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 528 (1982) (widow knew of husband's sale of 
property). For details, see Richard C.E. Beck, Looking far the Petject Woman: The Innocent Spouse 
in the Tax Court, REv. TAx'N INDIVIDUALS, Winter 1991, at 3. 
5 7. The principal factor considered under the equity test i; whether the wife benefited from the item over and 
above ordinary support. Sanders, 509 F.2d at 168 n.14. The courts have been inconsistent in interpret-
ing the meaning of "benefit." Some courts have held small divorce settlements (or inheritances) partially 
paid out of untaxed income to be a "benefit," and other courts have held large amounts not to be a 
"benefit." Compare, e.g., Levin v. Comm'r, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 6 (1987), with Estate of Brown v. 
Comm'r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 1249 (1988). For details, see Beck, supra note 56, at 17-29. 
Note also that because all elements for relief had to be met, the wife may lose even if she did not benefit at 
all, if she is found to have had reason to know of the item. The same is true under I.RC. section 6015(b). 
58. Compare Madden v. Comm'r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 652 (2006) (tuition for child benefited wife for pur-
poses ofl.R.C. section 6015(f)) and Levy v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1101 (2005), with Sanders v. 
United States, 369 F. Supp. 160, 167 (1973), ajfd, 509 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[P]robably most of 
any benefit from any of Charles' omissions from gross income will eventually accrue to the [adopted] child 
- for his feeding, shelter, and education."). 
59. See, e.g., Cohen v. Comm'r, 54 T.C.M. (CCH) 944 (1987) (divorced schoolteacher held liable for hus-
band's tax shelter deduction because she did not read return, although her .lwsband was CPA and Peat 
Marwick tax partner). 
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character or responsible behavior as wife and mother.60 Taxation obviously 
should not depend on subjective and idiosyncratic sympathies, and that is a major 
reason why the innocent spouse rules failed, and still fail to provide an acceptable 
and predictable remedy for the unjust effects of joint return liability. 
IV. THE FAILURE OF REFORM 
A. Background 
The American Bar Association ("ABA") recommended repeal of JRL in 
1995, essentially for the reasons stated in the preceding section.61 The ABA was 
persuaded that JRL could be repealed without changing the current rates, forms 
or filing statuses, and without creating significant new opportunities for tax-
payer abuse. In the Taxpayer Bill of Rights II, Congress directed both the Gen-
eral Accounting Office and the Treasury Department to conduct a study of 
innocent spouse issues, and specifically requested an evaluation of the ABA propo-
sal (among others).62 The Treasury's Report was over a year late, and arrived 
only just in time for the House Subcommittee on Oversight Hearings of February 
24, 1998,63 after the House version of the 1998 bill "Taxpayer Bill of Rights III" 
had already been passed.64 The Treasury Report did not concede very much. It 
recommended abolishing the "grossly erroneous" dollar thresholds for relief, and 
the "without foundation in fact or law" limitation on deductions, both of which 
had long been recommended by reformers.65 These are certainly improvements at 
the margin, but neither one mattered a great deal as long as the all-important 
"innocence" test remained in place; that was the wall against which most relief 
claims shattered.66 
60. Many of the inconsistencies in the Tax Court's decisions can be explained by its distinct preference for the 
traditional wife and mother as opposed to the educated and independent modern woman. For details, see 
Beck, supra note 56. 
61. See Domestic Relations Comm., Am. Bar Assoc. Section on Tax'n, Comments on Liability ef Divorced 
Spouses far Tax Deficiencies on Previously Filed joint Returns, 50 TAX LAW. 395 (1997). 
62. Taxpayer Bill of Rights II, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 401, 110 Stat. 1452, 1459 (1996). 
63. See Treasury Department Report on Innocent Spouse Relief Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight ef the Comm. on Ways & Means, 105th Cong. (1998) [hereinafter 1998 Report on IS 
Relief Hearing]. 
64. Taxpayer Bill of Rights Ill, Pub. L. No. 105-92, tit. Ill, 112 Stat. 685 (1998). However, the Treasury's 
views had apparently been shared with the House draftspersons. See Toni Robinson & Mary Ferrari, 
The New Innocent Spouse Provision: 'Reason and Law Walking Hand in Hand'?, 80 TAX NOTES 
835, 849 nn.65-66 (1998). 
65. See, e.g., Jerome Borison, Innocent Spouse Relief A Call far Legislative and judicial Liberalization, 
40 TAX LAW. 819 (1987). 
66. As for the dollar limitations, relief claims for under $500 are now allowed, but query whether many will 
bring them in view of the high cost of tax litigation, and general anxiety about antagonizing the I.R.S. 
Most potential claimants probably just fold and pay. Data as to this are lacking, as they are for most IS 
issues. The House bill (and the Treasury Report) also proposed two other forms of relief, both of which 
were enacted: (i) partial relief for items of which the wife knew or had reason to know of only a portion, 
943 
THE FAILURE OF INNOCENT SPOUSE REFORM 
The Treasury also promised to centralize innocent spouse decisions to ensure 
greater uniformity, to notify affected taxpayers of the existence of IS relief, and to 
publish forms and instructions to make IS relief requests easier, all of which was 
in fact done.67 It is difficult to quarrel with these improvements, except to point 
out that they do nothing to alleviate the underlying problem. It is a bit like 
addressing a problem of thousands of wrongly incarcerated persons by supplying 
them with easy-to-use forms for requesting a pardon from the governor. The 
Treasury could easily have put a warning of JSL on the signature line of the 
Form 1040,68 but this was not even considered, nor was it brought up at the 
House Subcommittee hearings. 
Another and still more significant potential improvement was (and re-
mains) in the Treasury's power to implement administratively, but which the 
Treasury also failed even to consider. This was to exhaust all possibilities for 
collection from the husband before starting any collection attempts against the 
wife. The issue was brought up briefly in the House Oversight Subcommittee 
hearings, but the Treasury's spokesman Donald Lubick managed to duck the 
question.69 Any such limitation would undercut the Treasury's chief reason for 
insisting on JRL, which is to allow agents to collect from the wife if she appears 
to have assets that are easy to reach ("low-hanging fruit") 70 without troubling 
themselves over the husband. 
The most interesting omission from the Treasury Report, however, is any 
estimate of what it might cost the Treasury if JRL were to be repealed. It would 
appear indispensable to know this in order to make any serious evaluation of the 
IS problem in general, and the ABA repeal proposal in particular. And yet the 
I.RS. never even attempted to keep records, according to the U.S. General Ac-
counting Office. Nobody at the Treasury or any other office in the government 
office knows even now, for example, in how many JRL collection cases the hus-
band could pay if he were pursued (and why he was not pursued), how much 
extra effort such collections might cost, and whether transferee liability might 
apply as an alternative. 71 If one considers as well the costs of processing some 
50,000 or more IS cases per year, and litigating fifty or so in the courts, all on an 
and (ii) expansion of Tax Court review to include all IRS denials of relief. See Taxpayer Bill of Rights 
III, 112 Stat. 685; see also 1998 Report on Hearing, supra note 63. 
67. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
68. In the private sector, it is unthinkable that a person could become liable as a guarantor of another's debts 
by signing a form which fails to even mention the guarantee obligation, much less its (unlimited) amount. 
Imagine a bank explaining to its perplexed victim that her status as guarantor is all explained in the 
(separate) instructions. 
69. 1998 Report on IS Relief Hearing, supra note 63, at 29-31 (question by Congressman Weller to Mr. 
Lubick who replied, in essence, that agents would be given sensitivity training about IS problems). 
70. Id. at 35 (statement of Lynda Willis). 
71 . The estimates should exclude JRL assessments which are not realistically collectible in the first place from 
either spouse. 
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individual fact-intensive basis, together with the foregone revenue from as-
signing audit personnel to these IS cases, 72 quite possibly the real net revenue 
costs of repealing JRL might be small. In any event, however, it seems odd that 
the Treasury is insistent that it needs to keep JRL when it apparently does not 
know why and is not concerned enough to find out. One might almost call this 
the Treasury's own "willful ignorance" or "ostrich imitation." 
Regarding the ABA proposal itself, the Treasury Report trotted out the old 
canard that JRL is justified by the tax savings,73 and finished up by blaming the 
victims of JRL. The Treasury Report blandly states in the pertinent part of its 
conclusions (not a single one of which had been discussed in the text itself) as 
follows: 
Second, the basic principle that taxpayers who file joint income tax 
returns are jointly and severally liable for the correct amount of the tax 
due for the period covered by the return is appropriate in the vast 
majority of cases. By signing and filing a joint return, and thus ob-
taining the advantages of joint filing, each spouse voluntarily under-
takes the responsibility for the correct joint liability. Taxpayers who 
wish to avoid this rule, and in effect obtain proportionate liability, 
already may elect to file separate returns using married filing separate 
status, although there is usually an economic penalty for doing so. Un-
deniably, however, additional effort should be made to ensure that tax-
payers are fully aware of their filing status options and the 
consequences of each filing status.74 
The House Bill retained JRL, as the Treasury wanted, and also kept the IS 
rules as they were, but stripped them of the "grossly erroneous" requirements of 
the dollar limitations and the rule limiting relief from non-income items to those 
having "no basis in fact or law." 
The Senate version was quite different, and followed the ABA proposal that 
a married person could elect to be taxed only upon her own income (which the 
Treasury Report had termed "back-end proportional liability"). The Conference 
Committee eventually combined these two very different proposals into a highly 
complexcompromise. The House proposal became new I.RC. section 6015(b), 
applicable to all taxpayers. The Senate proposal for separate liability became 
new I.RC. section 6015(c) and was limited to requests from separated and di-
72. See Steve Johnson, The 1998 Act and the Resources Link Between Tax Compliance and Tax Sim-
plification, 51 KAN. L. REV. 1013, 1058-59 (2003). Professor Johnson argues that the new IS rules 
waste scarce audit resources and create unreasonable costs. 
73. However, Mr. Lubick also states later on in the same report that the I.RS. does not have the resources to 
process up to forty-nine million new returns. See 1998 Report on IS Relief Hearing, supra note 63, at 
8 (statement of Mr. Lubick). It has been estimated that it would cost $200 million to do so. Thus, joint 
filing is convenient and beneficial to the government as well as the taxpayer, just as Congress intended in 
1918. 
74. Id. at 57. 
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vorced persons, watered down with some anti-abuse provisions and a new and 
weaker innocence test: The wife must not have "actual knowledge" (as opposed to 
constructive knowledge under I.RC. section 6015(b) and former I.RC. section 
6013(e)) in order to obtain relief, and the burden of proving actual knowledge is 
borne by the government. A third form of relief (and indirectly a third form of 
innocence) was enacted in I.RC. section 6015(£) which grants discretion to the 
Secretary to dispense equitable relief where appropriate in cases where I.RC. 
sections 6015(b) and (c) do not apply. The principal focus of equitable relief is 
cases of underpayment where the return was correct but the tax was not paid,75 
a situation for which there was no relief under former I.RC. section 6013(e). 
The bottom-line effect of all this is slightly more relief for some separated or 
divorced taxpayers, and for a very few women whose husbands failed to pay, but 
at an unreasonable cost both in complexity and in fairness to most other 
taxpayers. 
B. The New Rules 
Since 1998 there are three provlSlons for IS relief, new I.RC. sections 
6015(b), (c) and (f), each with its own peculiarities. Former I.RC. section 
6013(e) occupied one short subsection of the Code, but the new IS relief takes up 
an entire new section 6015, which has eight subsections of its own, some of which 
are longer than the entire former provision. In addition there are new regula-
tions which became final in July of 2002 and now occupy thirteen double-column 
pages in my CCH edition, which is more than a ten-fold increase in size. Even 
all this does not contain the rules for equitable relief under I.RC. section 6015(£), 
which are separately promulgated in Revenue Procedure 2003-61. Forms have 
been published for the first time specifically for requesting IS relief, 76 together 
with ancillary questionnaires, and informational notices of taxpayer rights. The 
new rules are not only numerous, they are also very complex, confusingly repeti-
tive and overlapping, and sometimes arbitrary and even incomprehensible. 
Of the three new forms of relief under I.RC. sections 6015(b), (c) and (f), 
the first is very similar to former I.RC. section 6013(e). As under former law, 
the wife may obtain IS relief if (i) there is an understatement of tax attributable 
to the husband, (ii) the wife establishes that she did not know, and had no reason 
to know, of the understatement,77 (iii) taking into account all of the facts and 
75. The Treasury probably thought that in many such situations its only opportunity for collection might be 
from the wife, rather than just its easiest one. For that reason, one supposes, the Treasury opposed codify-
ing equitable relief, and kept the rulemaking in its own hands. The resulting rules are very strict, and 
almost all taxpayers lose. 
76. Form 8857, Request for Innocent Spouse Relief (and Separation of Liability and Equitable Relief), avail-
able at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8857.pdf. 
77. This reason-to-know requirement was the bane of prior case law interpreting the former l.R.C. section 
6013(e}. Sadly, it was not repealed, and sadly, all the baneful old decisions under the case law remain 
precedent under new l.R.C. section 6015(b). 
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circumstances, it is inequitable to hold her liable for the deficiency, and if (iv) she 
makes a new election78 to be relieved of the liability not later than two years 
after the date that collection activities have begun with respect to the deficiency.79 
When the I.R.S. initiates collection activity, it must provide the taxpayer with 
information regarding her rights to apply for innocent spouse relief, and if the 
I.R.S. fails to do so, the two-year time period is tolled.80 If an individual fails to 
qualify for relief under I.R.C. section 6015(b) only because of the "knew or had 
reason to know" requirement, she may qualify for partial relief by establishing 
that she was not aware of the full extent of the understatement. 81 
Under I.RC. section 6015(c), the second of the three forms of relief, taxpay-
ers who are legally separated, divorced, or who have been living apart for a full 
year are eligible to elect "proportional" or separation of liability, and in principle 
they receive (unless some anti-abuse restrictions apply) nearly complete relief so 
that they are liable for taxes only on their own individual income. The sepa-
rated-or-living apart requirement is a dubious policy decision. 82 Married 
women should not be punished for staying married, nor should the tax law pro-
vide an incentive to end (or pretend to end) a marriage to avoid a large tax 
liability. Although it may seem that, all else being equal, it is more unfair to 
inflict JRL upon divorced than still-married women, it is rare that all else is 
equal. Extracting a large amount from a still-married woman may be far more 
injurious than a small amount from a divorced woman. 83 
7 8. Such an election was not required under the former law, and its purpose is obscure. An election is also 
required under I.RC. sections 6015(b), (c) and (£). The election has provoked considerable litigation over 
unnecessary questions of timeliness. 
79. Collection activities do not include a mere notice of deficiency or even a notice of intent to levy or a 
demand for payment. Only such activities as an actual levy, or commencement of a collection suit will 
start the two-year clock. So will the I.RS. offset of a refund. 
80. See, e.g., Ferris v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2005-131, 2005 WL 2090804 (U.S. Tax Ct. Aug. 31, 
2005); Nelson v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo 2005-9, 2005 WL 152020 (U.S. Tax Ct. Jan. 25, 2005); McGee v. 
Comm'r, 123 T.C. 314 (2004). 
81. I.RC. § 6015(b)(2) (2000). 
82. If it was a policy decision at all. All four witnesses at the televised Senate Finance Commmittee 1998 
Hearings who related their highly-publicized horror stories of I.RS. persecution on account of JRL were 
divorced women. It may be that the Treasury simply wanted to limit its losses by confining any substan-
tial new relief to this highly vocal group. Proposals to Reform the Innocent Spouse Tax Rules: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 98 TNT 32-23, Doc. 98-6302 (unofficial transcript); 
see also Robinson & Ferrari, supra note 64, at 844 n.69. 
83. Consider the recent case of Korchak v. Commissioner, 92 T.C.M (CCH) 199 (2006), in which the wife 
succeeded in obtaining relief under I.RC. section 6015(b), despite the fact that the return in question 
showed a refund of nearly $100,000 due to deductions of twice that amount. The Korchaks, both Ph.D.s 
in the sciences, had been happily married for forty-eight years at the time of trial in 2006. Helen 
Korchak, an academic researcher in immunology and mother of three, was sixty-five years old and plan-
ning to retire the next year. She faced a deficiency assessment of over two million dollars due entirely to 
Ernest Korchak's 1982 disallowed partnership losses from 1982. Ernest, now seventy, could not pay 
because he had subsequently lost some $700,000 in trying to turn around a business he invested in and 
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The rules for allocation of the deficiency under separation of liability are set 
forth in I.RC. section 6015(d) and in detailed regulations.84 In order to qualify, 
the wife may not have actual knowledge of the item giving rise to the deficiency. 
Although the statute puts the burden of establishing actual knowledge on the 
I.RS., the case law has somewhat weakened the intended remedial effect. Actual 
knowledge has been held to mean mere knowledge of the existence of the underly-
ing transaction, even if the wife had no reason to suspect that her husband misre-
ported it.85 Additional restrictions apply if there was a transfer of certain 
"disqualified assets" between the spouses,86 or if the I.RS. demonstrates that as-
sets were transferred between the spouses pursuant to a fraudulent scheme. 87 As 
under I.RC. section 6015(b), the election must be made within two years after 
collection activities have begun. Inexplicably, no refunds are allowed under 
I.RC. section 6015(c),88 though they are permitted under (b) and (f). 
The third and last form is equitable relief under I.RC. section 6015(£), 
which may apply if an individual fails to qualify under I.RC. section 6015(b) or 
(c), and taking into account all of the facts and circumstances it would be "inequi-
table" to hold her liable, as determined by the I.RS. The principal focus is to 
allow relief where the joint return was correctly filed, but the tax was not paid. 
Revenue Procedure 2003-61 89 sets forth certain threshold conditions that must be 
satisfied for any request for equitable relief to be considered, which include the 
two-year election and the separated-or-divorced requirements of I.RC. section 
managed. The I.RS. wanted to seize Helen's life savings (her retirement accounts) and her home on the 
eve of her planned retirement, and asserted that payment would cause her no hardship. 
84. Items giving rise to a deficiency are allocated first in full to the spouse who incurred them, and then 
allocated to the individuals filing the return in the same manner as it would have been if they had filed 
separate returns for the year. 
85. See Cheshire v. Comm'r, 282 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2002) (wife had actual knowledge of husband's early 
withdrawal from IRA even though she did not know that it was taxable and was advised that it was 
not). The Tax Court also decided en bane against the taxpayer in Cheshire, 115 T.C. 183 (2000), 
however the dissents seem to me to have the better argument. See also Svetlana G. Attestatova, The 
Bonds of joint Tax Liability Should Not be Stronger Than Marriage: Congressional Intent Behind 
Section 601 S{c) Separation of Liability Relief, 78 WASH. L. REv. 831 (2003). The government's prin-
cipal argument was that ignorance of the law is no excuse. This maxim of the criminal law makes sense 
only for the substantive tax law as applied to the husband or earning taxpayer; it is nonsense when 
applied to the wife whose "knowledge" is supposedly being tested for JRL liability. See Beck, supra note 
56, at 25-28. For more confusion between substantive liability and derivative liability through JRL, see 
infra note 91. 
86. I.RC. § 6015(c)(4)(B) (2000). 
87. I.RC. § 6015(c)(3)(A)(ii). Both anti-abuse provisions seem to have been added either at the insistence of 
the Treasury, or in order to humor it. The Treasury Report resisted repeal of JSL because it saw hobgob-
lins of abuse waiting to pounce, in the form of fraudulent schemes where one spouse would transfer all the 
couple's assets to the other to put them beyond the I.RS.'s reach. The Report gave no examples of such 
schemes, and did not ask why savvy couples do not now file separately to employ these hobgoblins. 
88. I.RC. § 6015(g)(3). 
89. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. 
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6015(c), together with an even larger array of anti-abuse conditions too lengthy 
to catalog here, plus a threshold requirement that the requesting spouse will suf-
fer economic hardship if relief is not granted. In addition, the unpaid items must 
be those of the husband (with a surprising exception which apparently makes it 
possible in some situations (absurdly) to relieve a taxpayer of liability for her 
own tax items).90 If all these threshold conditions are met, the I.RS. may grant 
relief if it determines that it would be "inequitable" to hold the requesting spouse 
liable, taking account of all the facts and circumstances. 
Revenue Procedure 2003-61 goes on to list some factors which will incline 
the I.RS. favorably or unfavorably toward granting relief. Some of the 
favorable factors seem to duplicate the "threshold" factors, such as marital status 
and economic hardship. Others track the requirements of I.RC. section 6015(b), 
viz. lack of knowledge, actual or constructive,91 and lack of significant benefit. 
Still others are peculiar to equitable relief, such as liability of the husband to pay 
the tax pursuant to a divorce or separation agreement, and whether the wife has 
kept current with her taxes - a sort of good citizenship test. The negativ~ factors 
listed are for the most part simply the contrary of the positive ones. No one factor 
is to be given determinative weight. With such a long and difficult obstacle 
course it is not surprising that very few women have qualified for equitable 
relief. 
Finally, for relief under I.RC. sections 6015(b) and (c) - but, inexplicably, 
not for equitable relief under (f) - the statute requires that the non-requesting 
spouse be afforded notice and the opportunity to become a party in the relief 
90. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, section 4.01(7) makes it a threshold condition for relief from tax on an item that the 
item be attributable to the wife, but with exceptions, notably that of section 4.01(7)(c) which is nonpay-
ment of tax due to misappropriation by the husband of funds intended to pay the tax. It is not clear 
whether this is even limited to funds provided by the wife. Needless to say, if a third party misappropri-
ates funds intended to pay tax, no relief is available. Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296. 
This provision revises Rev. Proc. 2000-15, section 4.03(1)(f) which stated that if an item is "attributable 
to non-requesting spouse" that is simply one factor among six which should be considered in favor of 
granting relief - in other words, relief appeared to be available from one's own items under the right 
circumstances. Rev. Proc. 2000-15, 2000-1 C.B. 447. This is testimony to the powerful appeal of inno-
cence doctrine as a source of liability. Nobody appears ever to have qualified, however. 
91 . The "innocence" test has become so far unmoored from its origins in Scudder that it has now drifted to 
situations where no signature at all was ever at issue and the question of fraud or duress is irrelevant. 
l.R.C. section 66(c), for example, which provides for limited relief from community property liability for 
income of the other spouse under Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), now contains the same innocence 
test as I.R.C. section 6015(b), even though the liability routinely applies to taxpayers filing separate 
returns or even no returns at all. The flush language of I.RC. section 66(c), which was added by the 
1998 Reform Act, provides for "equitable relief' which the courts have interpreted as interchangeable with 
the conditions for such relief under l.R.C. section 6015(£). See, e.g., Bennett v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 
2005-84, 2005 WL 1405977 (U.S. Tax Ct. June 16, 2005) (wife filing separately challenged her W2 
statement as phony concoction of husband; her argument was accepted but she was subjected instead to 
Seaborn liability for tax on half her husband's salary, and because she knew he was employed, no relief 
available under I.RC. section 66(c)). 
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proceedings. 92 The notice and intervention rule has been held to apply to all 
deficiency proceedings in which an innocent spouse claim is raised, as well as to 
"stand-alone" proceedings, i.e., those which are not ancillary to deficiency or col-
lection due process claims, in which equitable relief is the only issue. 93 This pro-
vision seems to have no other purpose than to invite the husband to testify 
against the wife on the all-important factual question of innocence.94 As under 
prior law, if the wife is forced to pay the liability of the husband is extin-
guished, 95 and this invites hostile and self-serving testimony as to the degree of 
knowledge of, or the economic benefits enjoyed by the petitioning spouse. It 
would have been preferable to invite the husband to become a party only in the 
(extraordinarily rare) case of uncertainty as to which spouse should be attributed 
the item of income or deduction at issue. 
C. The New Rules in Action 
The 1998 Reforms ushered in a new administrative system as well as new 
rules and new forms. The I.RS. now has an entire processing center in Coving-
ton, Kentucky devoted to the processing of IS claims which was staffed as of 2001 
by 157 employees. 96 In all, it is reported that the equivalent of 953 full-time 
employees were expected to work exclusively on IS case processing in 2001, with 
most or all of them drawn from the ranks of auditing personnel.97 Despite this, 
claims processing is painfully slow, in part because of the unexpectedly large 
number of claims for relief, 98 and in part because each claim must be decided on a 
case-by-case individual basis. In FY 2005, the I.RS. took an average 192 days 
92. I.RC. §§ 6015(e)(4), (h)(2). 
93. See King v. Comm'r, 115 T.C. 118 (2000). 
94. See Van Arsdalen v. Commissioner, 123 T.C. 135 (2004), cited in the National Taxpayer Advocate's 
2005 annual report to Congress: "(T]he I.RS. served notice on Ms. Van Arsdalen's former spouse, Mr. 
Murray, of his right to intervene in the case for the sole purpose ef challenging Ms. Van Arsdalen's 
right to Section 6015 relief. Mr. Murray filed a notice of intervention and expressed his intent to inter-
vene for the sole purpose of supporting his former wife's right to relie£" The Tax Court decided that the 
intervenor's rights were not so restricted, and the I.RS. subsequently revised its notice of filing. NT A 
REP. 2005, supra note 9, at 534. 
In Baronowicz v. Commissioner, 423 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2005), it was held that the husband had no 
right to appeal a decision in favor of his wife, on the ground that he remained liable for the full amount 
whatever the outcome, and that he was therefore not aggrieved. This seems doubtful. It supposes that if 
the I.RS. won it would ignore its victory and collect from the husband instead. However, the court was 
refreshingly direct in stating that the government was harmed by its loss in being "deprived of an addi-
tional source from which to recover." Id. at 975. 
95. Except for liability for contribution under state law, if the innocent spouse is forced to pay, which is a rare 
and expensive proceeding. 
96. GAO, INNOCENT SPOUSE PROGRAM, supra note 6, at 10. 
97. Ryan]. Donmoyer, The New Innocent Spouse Reliefi More Popular than Anyone Thought, 87TAx 
NOTES 1023 (2000). 
98. Everyone agrees that the 50,000 or so new claims per year is a huge increase since the 1998 reforms, but 
no one knows exactly how huge because the I.RS. did not keep records for earlier years. 
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to process IS claims which were ultimately allowed in full by the examination 
function, and 807 days for claims which went to the Appeals function. 99 The 
outcomes are still more painful, because relief was granted in only about 30% of 
claims.100 
The National Taxpayer Advocate ("NT A'') paints a depressing picture of the 
typical victim of JRL. She is overwhelmingly likely to be a relatively low-in-
come single mother forced to pay the taxes of a wealthier husband or ex-husband: 
... [sixty-five] percent of the taxpayers who request innocent spouse or 
community property relief make less than $30,000 per year. Ninety 
per cent are women. Thirty-four percent are single filers and another 
51 percent file as "head of household," meaning they are unmarried and 
maintain a home for children of other persons .... On average, women 
earn only 25 percent of the income reported on a joint return. Thus, 
the most frequent effect of joint and several liability may be to require 
low income women who are often raising children by themselves, to 
insure the I.RS. against underreporting or underpayment of tax 
earned by a husband or former husband.101 
If one examines the post-reform court decisions, the record is no less depress-
ing. The NTA counted forty-five IS decisions between June 1, 2004 and May 31, 
2005. Of these, thirty-three were decided in favor of the I.RS., eleven in favor 
of the taxpayer, and one was a split decision. Where one of the three forms of 
substantive relief was litigated, every case considered the innocence issue, and 
most turned upon it, or at least appeared to. The NTA's 2006 Report counted 
fifty-one court decisions, of which thirty-one were decided in favor of the govern-
ment, ten in favor of the taxpayer, and two sere split decisions.102 
Of the new forms of relief, the separation of liability issue of actual knowl-
edge was litigated in four cases in 2005, and the I.RS. lost all four for failure to 
carry its burden of proof as to "actual knowledge" under I.RC. section 
6015(c)(3)(C). In 2006, the opposite occurred, and the I.RS. won eight out of 
nine litigated decisions under I.RC. section 6015(c). It seems uncertain whether 
the actual knowledge standard of I.RC. section 6015(c) favors separated and 
divorced taxpayers as intended, at least to judge by their success rate as compared 
to the two other forms of relief. As noted above, 103 separated and divorced tax-
payers often enjoyed an unstated preference and sometimes an explicit one under 
the general "equitable under the circumstances" test under former I.RC. section 
6013(e), and so it is difficult to be sure how great an improvement the new 
99. NTA REP. 2005, supra note 9, at 423. 
100. Id. 
l 01. Id. at 422 (using I.R.S. statistics from 2001). 
l 02. NTA REP. 2006, supra note 9, at 617. 
l 03. See discussion supra note 54. 
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standard has brought. That there is some advantage at the margin is clearly 
shown by decisions in which the taxpayer requests relief under both I.RC. sec-
tions 6015(b) and (c) for the same item, and the taxpayer loses under (b) because 
she had "reason to know" but wins under (c) because the I.RS. is unable to prove 
actual knowledge.104 
It seems fair to say, however, that the new standard of actual knowledge is 
just as flexible as the others in the interest of justifying a desired result. For 
example, in Zachry v. Commissioner,105 the Tax Court allowed the govern-
ment to win by using a surprisingly stringent standard for actual knowledge 
under I.RC. section 6015(c), and ignoring the l.RS.'s burden of proof alto-
gether.106 In King v. Commissioner,107 on the other hand, the Tax Court ar-
guably used too lenient a standard, and held that the I.RS. had not carried its 
burden of proof despite the wife's admissions of knowledge of all the factual cir-
cumstances necessary to determine whether the husband's deductions were 
allowable. 108 
104. See, e.g., Levy v. Comm'r, 89 T.C.M. (CCH) 1101 (2005). In Levy, the husband, a surgeon with a 
gambling problem, filed for bankruptcy two months after signing a divorce agreement in which he prom-
ised to be responsible for over $ 700,000 of tax debts, and fully discharged the tax debts leaving his wife to 
hold the bag. She was exonerated for 1979 under I.R.C. section 6015(c) for a tax shelter deficiency. For 
the years 1991-1999 there were underpayments but no deficiency and so the only relief available was 
under I.R.C. section 6015(£). After a lengthy weighing of factors, the Tax Court relieved her of liability 
for 1991-1995, but not for 1996-1999 on the ground that she had learned of her husband's prior unpaid 
taxes for the first time in 1997, and thus had "reason to know" that he might not pay the taxes for 
1996-1999. Note, however, that she signed these returns anyway under the advice of their accountant. 
105. Zachry v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2005-55, 2005 WL 1041130 (U.S. Tax Ct. May 5, 2005). 
106. The wife testified that she knew her ex-husband had received about $200,000 from his mother's estate, 
but that she thought it had all come from sale of the mother's home, and did not know that some of the 
money had come from the mother's retirement account. Her ex-husband as intervenor testified that she 
did know. The court stated that it found neither spouse's testimony to be credible. It then said that the 
Petitioner had "offered no evidence other than her own testimony, to substantiate her lack of knowledge" 
and that therefore the I.R.S. had not abused its discretion by denying relief under I.R.C. section 6015(c). 
This seems to ignore the fact that the burden of proof is on the I.R.S. to show that the wife had actual 
knowledge, and that the I.R.S. had introduced no evidence at all other than the intervenor's discredited 
testimony. 
107. King v. Comm'r, 116 T.C. 198 (2001). 
108. The wife participated in the operation of husband's livestock farm and kept all its books and records. She 
was aware of the farm's losses, but she believed (and thought her husband believed) that it would gradu-
ally become profitable. The I.R.S. disallowed the husband's losses under I.R.C. section 183 after deter-
mining that he did not have the requisite primary motive to earn a profit. The Tax Court exonerated the 
wife, however, on the ground that the I.R.S. did not carry its burden of proof to show that the wife had 
actual knowledge of the husband's lack of a primary objective to make a profit. The problem with this 
conclusion is that nobody can know what the husband's primary motive is except the husband. The I.R.S. 
and the court can only infer from the facts what his motive was likely to be, and the wife knew first-hand 
at least as much of the facts as they did, and probably much more. On the other hand, neither taxpayer 
had challenged the assessment itself, and it is possible that the judge did not believe that I.R.C. section 183 
should have applied in the first place. Or perhaps the judge was simply put off by the husband's interven-
tion and testimony against his ex-wife. 
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Equitable relief was litigated very frequently, if only because it was thrown 
in along with claims for innocent spouse and separation of liability relief. As of 
this writing, the Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to decide "stand-alone" 
cases of equitable relief, i.e., those which are not ancillary to deficiency or collec-
tion due process claims.109 Of the twenty-three cases reported for 2005, eighteen 
taxpayers lost and five won. Of these five, one was relieved of a penalty only, 
and another three were exonerated apparently only because of spousal abuse. 
These figures bear out at least in part the general observation that equitable 
relief under I.RC. section 6015(£) is extremely difficult to obtain.11° One has to 
sample the case law to see just how difficult. 
Consider Chadwick v. Commissioner111 taken. from our survey of 2005 
decisions. There the wife was denied relief because she did not furnish any "docu-
mentary evidence" to support her uncontradicted testimony that she had no rea-
son to know her husband did not pay his share of the joint taxes along with all 
the other household bills she trusted him to pay.112 Exactly what sort of docu-
ments would have backed up her testimony the court does not tell us, and none 
leaps to mind. 11 3 
On the other hand, in the rare event that a court is moved to sympathize 
with the wife, it may ignore virtually all of the factors for equitable relief except 
the factor of spousal abuse. Consider, for example, Bright v. Commissioner, in 
which the wife was relieved from liability for a 1995 underpaid joint return and 
found to have no reason to know that her husband would not pay.114 She testi-
fied that her husband had a longstanding pattern before 1995 of filing late, not 
making full payment with the return, and entering into installment agreements 
for the delinquent taxes. Because the prior installments had ultimately been paid, 
l 09. See Billings v. Comm'r, 127 T.C. 7 (2006) (9-8 decision, en bane). The difficulty is due to a drafting 
glitch. See Bryan Camp, Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 108 TAX NOTES 359 (2005). The Tax 
Court's jurisdiction will probably be reinstated. Senators Feinstein and Kyl have introduced a bill to do 
just that, S. 3523, 109th Cong., § 1 (2006), cited in Billings, 127 T.C. at 30 n.16 (Chiechi, J., dissent-
ing). In Billings, the "equities" were all on the taxpayer's side. The petitioner husband filed an amended 
return and paid the tax as soon as he learned of his wife's embezzlements. For this responsible behavior 
the I.R.S. punished him because at the time of the amended return he (of course) knew of the embezzle-
ment! The Tax Court pointed out that the taxpayer had a strong case in light of precedent (and might 
have added, in light of fairness and common sense as well). 
110. For that reason Professor Johnson believes that it was a mistake to enact I.R.C. section 6015(f) because it 
is wasteful of I.R.S. resources. Johnson, supra note 72, at 1058. 
111. Chadwick v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2005-154, 2005 WL 2649124 (U.S. Tax Ct. Oct. 17, 2005). 
112. Id. 
11 3. Nor does the court explain why she should still have such records - whatever they might have been -
ten years later. It was also found that the wife would not suffer hardship if she had to pay the tax. Her 
income and expense statement, which was accepted by the court, showed monthly income of $1353 and 
expenses of $1220 (including monthly food and clothing of $100 each, and nothing for entertainment) 
leaving $133 per month to pay taxes. The unpaid tax including interest and penalties appears to have 
been about $7000, or about one-half of a year's take home pay. 
114. Bright v. Comm'r, T.C. Summ. Op. 2005-145, 2005 WL 2444050 (U.S. Tax Ct. Oct. 4, 2005). 
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the court the court found that the wife had no reason to think they would not be 
paid for 1995 as well, albeit late. The wife filed no income and expense state-
ment to prove payment would cause her hardship, but this also did not interfere 
with the court's decision in her favor. The reason for this surprising outcome 
seems to be that the husband abused alcohol and drugs and threatened his wife 
and their son with violence.115 But for the abusive behavior, the case appears 
difficult to distinguish from another 2005 decision of the same court, Negoescu 
v. Commissioner. 116 
Finally, it is interesting to note that when intervenors were present in six of 
the cases in 2005-2006 sample, the wife obtained relief in five cases anyway. 
The courts generally did not believe the husbands' testimony, and their presence 
seems generally to backfire and perhaps even favor the wife's chances of success. 
Summing up, it seems fair to say that there are now more cases than before 
the 1998 reforms, and that the law and the decisions are more complex, but that 
there is no more certainty, consistency or rationality in the case law than before. 
And because the ratio of wins and losses appears very similar in samples taken 
nearly twenty years apart, one may perhaps conclude also that the quality and 
consistency of the administrative dispositions are also no better now than 
before.117 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The IS rules can never provide a satisfactory solution to the inequities of 
JRL. In part this is because innocence is an irrational basis for relief and can 
never be made rigorous or consistent. But the primary reason is that JRL itself 
lacks any justification: Everyone deserves to be taxed only on her own income, 
and that means everyone deserves relief. There is no natural stopping point for 
relief, and therefore the present rules as well as any future ones are necessarily 
arbitrary. 
One day JRL will have to be repealed because civilized society cannot toler-
ate forever the tax persecution of women. If the 1998 reforms have any value, it 
is perhaps that they may bring that day nearer. The extremely high cost of 
processing case-by-case the present avalanche of claims may shake the I.R.S out of 
115. Id.; see also Baumann v. Comm'r, 2005 T.C.M. (RIA) 2005-031, 2005 WL 407648 (U.S. Tax Ct. Feb. 
22, 2005) (finding that documented abuse trumped even the factor of actual knowledge of the husband's 
gambling). 
116. Negoescu, 2005 WL 3068362. Note as well that in Negoescu, subsequent tax behavior was held 
against the wife because her 1993 joint taxes were not fully paid until 1995, although she was not 
divorced until 1997, and despite the fact that she appears to have been current with her taxes from 1995 
until trial in 2005. In Bright, on the other hand, the wife's late payment of taxes for 2001, several years 
after her 1998 divorce, was excused. Bright, 2005 WL 2444050. 
11 7. A sampling for the calendar year 1987 found thirty-two reported IS decisions, and in twenty-three of 
them the petitioner lost. Two of the thirty-two petitioners were men, and both lost. See Beck, supra note 
14, at 327 n.33. 
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its intransigence and force it to recalculate whether all this work and expense is 
really worth the ill-gotten gains. At a time when the "tax gap" is perceived to be 
widening, and tax morality falling, it is short-sighted policy at best to alienate 
taxpayers with glaringly unfair collection practices. JRL should be repealed. 
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